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1670 royal charter of the "Governor and Company of Adventurers of England 
Trading into Hudson Bay." Hudson's Bay Company Archives 
rm here the rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are concerned, history and law are insepar-able. Lawyers working on Aboriginal claims ignore 
history at their peril. But the converse is also true -
historians whose work involves the Aboriginal peoples 
cannot afford to disregard law. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in Rupert's Land, out of which the 
province of Manitoba was at least partially created. Solu-
tions to lingering questions of sovereignty, territorial bound-
aries, jurisdiction, title to land, and so on, all must be sought 
in the middle ground where law and history overlap. In this 
article, we will venture onto this ground in an effort to 
resolve a long-standing debate over the validity of Aborig-
inal and British claims to sovereignty in that region. 
Rupert's Land, of course, is the territory that was 
granted to the Hudson's Bay Company by Royal Charter in 
1670. It is commonly assumed that this territory encom-
passed all the lands in North America that drain into 
Hudson Bay and Strait. I am going to challenge the 
assumption that the Charter actually conveyed the whole of 
that territory to the Company. My view is that the Compa-
ny's territory included only those lands within the Hudson 
watershed that the Company was actually able to possess 
and effectively control. Even in 1869-70, when the Company 
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surrendered Rupert's Land back to the Crown, most of the 
lands within the Hudson watershed were not possessed or 
controlled by the Company at all - they were possessed 
and controlled by Aboriginal nations, some of whom had 
inhabited the region for thousands of years. 
This question of the extent of the Hudson' s Bay Compa-
ny's territory is obviously a matter of considerable historical 
interest, but does it have any contemporary significance? 
The answer is definitely yes - it could be of great im-
portance for present-day Aboriginal rights. This is mainly 
because the Supreme Court of Canada, in its landmark 
decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,1 decided recent-
ly that Aboriginal title to land in Canada today depends on 
proof of exclusive Aboriginal occupation at the time the 
British Crown acquired sovereignty over the territory where 
the lands are located. 
The date of British acquisition of sovereignty is thus 
vital to Aboriginal land claims, within Rupert's Land as well 
as in other parts of Canada, or at least those parts of Canada 
that were not first acquired by France. The questions of 
when the Crown acquired Rupert's Land, and the geograph-
ical extent of the Hudson's Bay Company territory, are thus 
crucial to Aboriginal land claims. In my opinion, these 
questions cannot be answered simply by looking at the date 
of the Hudson's Bay Company Charter and the description 
of Rupert's Land in that document. Other factors, such as the 
means by which sovereignty could be acquired at the time 
in international and British colonial law, have to be consid-
ered. Even in 1670, it is very doubtful that King Charles' 
signature on a piece of parchment could effectively bestow 
sovereignty over a vast territory, most of which had not 
even been explored, let alone possessed, by British subjects. 
This is especially so when most (if not all) of that territory 
was actually possessed by Aboriginal peoples, the vast 
majority of whom had no knowledge of the existence of 
Britain or of Prince Rupert and his Company of Ad-
venturers. 
To properly assess this matter, we need to take a closer 
look at the Hudson's Bay Company Charter itself.2 By the 
Charter, Charles II incorporated the Hudson's Bay Compa-
ny and granted it a number of rights and privileges, 
including a monopoly on trade and commerce in Rupert's 
Land. But the provision that concerns us most is the grant 
to the Company of "all the Landes and Territoryes upon the 
Countryes Coastes and confynes of the Seas Bayes Lakes 
Rivers Creekes and Soundes" that lay within the entrance to 
Hudson Strait.3 Assuming that this was meant to include all 
of the Hudson watershed (I am not contesting that inter-
pretation), the question that must be asked is whether this 
grant was effective to convey what it purported to convey, 
namely, title to all those lands. This would depend on 
whether the Crown had sovereignty over Rupert's Land and 
title to the lands within it at the time the Charter was issued, 
as it is a fundamental principle of English law that no one-
and this includes the King or Queen - can convey a title to 
lands that he or she has no interest in or power over. 
In order to have title to the lands that he purported to 
grant to the Hudson' s Bay Company, King Charles would 
first have had to have sovereignty over Rupert's Land. How 
might that have been acquired? In British colonial law, there 
were four ways for the Crown to acquire sovereignty 
inheritance from another sovereign, conquest, cession by 
international treaty, and settlement.4 We can immediately 
eliminate the first three possibilities, as they simply did not 
occur in Rupert's Land. That leaves settlement. Basically, 
this means peopling a territory with British subjects so that 
effective possession and control is established in the name of 
the Crown. In fact, it has been decided in a number of 
Canadian court cases that Rupert's Land was acquired 
by settlement.5 What is not so clear is how and when this 
occurred. 
A look at the historical record reveals that, at the time 
the Hudson's Bay Company Charter was issued in 1670, 
British claims to Rupert's Land rested precariously on 
voyages of discovery made by various English seafarers, 
including Hudson (1610), Bylot and Baffin (1615), and Foxe 
(1631).6 While some of these captains did lay claim to the 
region for the Crown, none of them attempted to establish 
permanent settlements. Not until Groseilliers and Radisson 
escorted English traders to the rich fur region in James Bay 
in 1668-69 was a post, called Charles Fort, actually con-
structed at the mouth of the Rupert River. It was in fact the 
success of those two voyages that prompted the organizers 
to petition King Charles for the Chatter he issued the 
following year.7 
The efficacy of voyages of discovery and symbolic acts 
as means of acquiring sovereignty in the seventeenth cen-
tury is extremely doubtful, both in international and British 
colonial law. While the European colonizers all relied on 
these means to support their own territorial pretensions, 
they tended to ridicule such flimsy claims when presented 
by their rivals. Clearly, there was no established state 
practice - even among European nations - that would 
validate these means of acquiring sovereignty in interna-
tional law.8 Similarly, in British colonial law acquisition of 
sovereignty by settlement was based on the concept of 
occupancy, which required effective taking of possession.9 
Given that, apart from Charles Fort, the British had not even 
met their own standards for acquisition of sovereignty, the 
Crown's claim to Rupert's Land at the time the Charter was 
issued rested on shaky ground indeed. 
What about the Hudson's Bay Company Charter itself? 
Could it serve as an effective assertion of sovereignty by 
Charles II and thereby give the Crown title to the territory 
of Rupert's Land that it had not previously acquired? The 
answer to this is clearly 1w. The very same issue arose in 
relation to Matabeleland in present-day Zimbabwe in the 
case of Staples v. The Queen,10 decided in 1899 by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of appeal 
for the British Empire. A major issue in the case was whether 
the British Crown had sovereignty over Matabeleland in the 
1890s. Counsel for Staples argued that the Crown did have 
sovereignty because it had issued a Royal Charter to the 
British South Africa Company, authorizing it to hold lands 
in Matabeleland. The Privy Council rejected that argument. 
An exchange that occurred between the Lord Chancellor 
and legal counsel during the course of argument is particu-
larly revealing: 
The Lord Chancellor: Have you ever heard of 
sovereignty being insisted upon by reason of such 
a grant? It is new to me that such a thing was ever 
heard of. 
Staples' Counsel: I ask you to look at the terms of 
the grant. 
The Lord Chancellor: The terms of the grant cannot 
do what you assume it can do, namely give jurisdic-
tion of sovereignty over a place Her Majesty has no 
authority in.11 
Similarly, the Hudson' s Bay Company Charter could not 
give the Crown sovereignty over a territory where Charles 
II had no authority, and in fact was incapable of exercising 
authority, at the time the Charter was issued. 
A better way of viewing the Charter is therefore not as 
an immediate grant of Rupert's Land to the Hudson's Bay 
Company, but as a grant of a right to acquire lands within 
the Hudson watershed by actually possessing them, or 
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purchasing them from the Aboriginal peoples.12 On this 
interpretation, the grant of lands in the Charter was merely 
prospective. Whether this is what Charles II actually intend-
ed does not matter. In English law, when the Crown 
attempts to grant more than it has, the courts do not 
necessarily invalidate the grant (though that is a possibility). 
Instead, they usually give it some effect if they can, by 
allowing it to convey whatever title the Crown has.13 While 
the Crown would not have had title to any lands in Rupert's 
Land prior to acquiring sovereignty there, it could have 
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authorized British subjects to settle there in its name and 
acquire lands for themselves. The effect of this, once 
settlement actually took place, would have been to give the 
Crown sovereignty over, and the settlers title to, any lands 
that they were actually able to possess or purchase from the 
Aboriginal peoples. By the Charter, the Crown therefore 
could have authorized the Hudson's Bay Company to 
acquire as much of Rupert's Land as it could by possession 
or purchase from the Aboriginal peoples, thereby vesting 
sovereignty over the acquired territory in the Crown. The 
prospective grant of lands would then have taken effect to 
give the Company title to the lands it possessed or pur-
chased on the Crown's authority. 
This application of the Charter is supported by the 
decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
1884 in the Ontario Boundaries Case.1·1 That case involved a 
protracted dispute between Canada and Manitoba on the 
one hand and Ontario on the other regarding the location of 
the boundary between those two provinces. The location of 
that boundary depended on interpretation of the Quebec Act 
of 1774,15 which defined the western boundary of Quebec, 
part of which later became the western boundary of Upper 
Canada and hence of Ontario, as running "Northward" 
from the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers "to 
the Southern Boundary of the Territory granted to the 
Merchants Adventurers of England, trading to Hudson's 
Bay". What is interesting about the Ontario Boundaries Case 
for our purposes is that the Privy Council did not locate that 
southern boundary at the height of land between the 
Mississippi and Hudson watersheds, as one would have 
expected if the Hudson' s Bay Company's territory included 
the whole of the Hudson drainage basin. Instead, the Privy 
Council decided that the western boundary of Quebec met 
the southern boundary of the Company's territory at the 
Winnipeg River, about 140 kilometers north-east of Winni-
peg. That is a considerable distance north of the height of 
land. 
So what was the basis for this decision respecting the 
southern boundary of the Company's territory? This is 
clearly revealed in remarks made by the Lord Chancellor 
during the course of argument. Referring to the Hudson's 
Bay Company Charter, he said this: 
I do not think one would be disposed to dispute the 
proposition that, so far as the Crown of England could 
give it, it gave to the Hudson's Bay Company 
a right, if they were able to make themselves masters of 
the country, to the territory up to the sources of the 
rivers; but they did not make themselves masters of the 
whole of that country, for some other nation had come in 
in the meantime.16 
The "other nation" referred to by the Lord Chancellor was 
France, which had established a string of fur-trading posts 
within the Hudson watershed in the eighteenth century, 
after the grant of the Charter. As the Winnipeg River was 
part of the main French route to the west, the Company 
clearly had not made itself master of the country south of 
that river. That, in my opinion, was why the Privy Council 
located the southern boundary of the Company's territory at 
the Winnipeg River.17 
No real significance was attached to the presence of 
Aboriginal peoples within the Hudson watershed in the 
Ontario Boundaries Case. This is not surprising, given prevail-
ing European and Canadian attitudes toward indigenous 
peoples at the time. When the case was decided in 1884, 
colonialism was still acceptable in Europe- in fact, the most 
powerful European nations, including Britain, were en-
gaged in the partition of Africa during the 1880s. So-called 
"scientific" theories ofhumanevolution, classifying societies 
on a scale from barbaric to civilized, were also prevalent.18 
In jurisprudence, legal positivism, which views law as the 
command of the sovereign, dominated juridical thought. 
These factors all contributed to a European mind-set that 
viewed tribal societies as primitive, without law or sover-
eignty. These influences can be clearly seen in some of the 
leading decisions of the day, such as Cooper v. Stuart, where 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1889 de-
scribed Australia as "a tract of territory practically unoccu-
pied, without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time when 
it was peacefully annexed to the British dominions". 19 In 
Canada, the influence of legal positivism is revealed in St. 
Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, where 
the Privy Council decided in 1888 that any land rights the 
Saulteaux Indians may have had, prior to signing Treaty 3 
(1873) in the Lake of the Woods region, originated in the 
pronouncement of George ID in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 and depended "upon the good will of the Sovereign."20 
Not only have the attitudes underlying those decisions 
been discredited and for the most part rejected, but the 
aspects of the decisions that rely on those attitudes have also 
been discarded. In Australia, in the Mabo decision of 1992,21 
the High Court (the equivalent of the Supreme Court of 
Canada) decided that the indigenous peoples did have 
settled law and did have title to land at the time of British 
colonization, and that their native title continued until 
validly extinguished. In Canada, in the 1973 Calder decision 
and subsequent cases the Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that Aboriginal land rights depend on royal proclamation or 
other official recognition.22 In the Delgamuukw decision,23 as 
mentioned earlier, the Court made clear that the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada had title to any lands that were exclusive-
ly occupied by them at the time the Crown acquired 
sovereignty. 
Moreover, in Canada even the idea that the Aboriginal 
peoples lacked sovereignty prior to European colonization 
has been undercut by more recent judicial decisions. An 
example of the old, ethnocentric attitude can be found in the 
1929 Nova Scotia decision in The Queen v. Syliboy, where 
Justice Patterson said this: 
A civilized nation first discovering a country of 
uncivilized people or savages held such country as 
its own until such time as by treaty it was trans-
ferred to some other civilized nation. The savages' 
rights of sovereignty even of ownership were never 
recognized. Nova Scotia had passed to Great Britain 
not by gift or purchase from or even by conquest of 
the Indians but by treaty with France, which had 
acquired it by priority of discovery and ancient 
possession; and the Indians passed with it.24 
Commenting on this passage in the 1984 Simon decision, 
Brian Dickson, Chief Justice of Canada, said: 
... the language used by Patterson J., illustrated in 
this passage [quoted in part above], reflects the 
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biases and prejudices of another era in our history. 
Such language is no longer acceptable in Canadian 
law and, indeed, is inconsistent with a growing 
sensitivity to native rights in Canada.25 
In Sioui v. Attorney-General of Quebec26 the Supreme 
Court went a step further toward recognizing the sovereign 
status of the Indian nations. Referring to the period prior to 
the fall of Quebec in 1759, Justice Lamer (now Chief Justice 
of Canada) observed: 
... we can conclude from the historical documents 
that both Great Britain and France felt that the 
Indian nations had sufficient independence and 
played a large enough role in North America for it 
to be good policy to maintain relations with them 
very close to those maintained between sovereign nations. 
The mother countries did everything in their 
power to secure the alliance of each Indian nation 
and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to 
change sides. When these efforts met with success, 
they were incorporated in treaties of alliance or 
neutrality. This clearly indicates that the Indian 
nations were regarded in their relations with the Europe-
an nations which occupied North America as inde-
pendent nations.27 
Returning to our discussion of Rupert's Land, we saw 
that the Privy Council in the Ontario Boundaries Case 
excluded territory occupied by the French from the 
Hudson' s Bay Company's territory. But given the changes in 
judicial attitudes to the Aboriginal peoples since that case 
was decided, territory occupied by Aboriginal nations 
should be excluded as well. British sovereignty over that 
excluded territory would therefore not have been acquired 
until the British were actually able to take possession and 
exercise effective control. In international law, this mode of 
acquisition of territory is generally known as "prescription". 
However, according to R.Y. Jennings, for prescription to be 
effective "the possession must be long-continued, undis-
turbed, and it must be unambiguously attributable to a claim 
to act as sovereign;" moreover, where the possession is 
adverse to the claim of a prior sovereign, "there must also 
be acquiescence on the part of the original sovereign."28 
To the extent that the Aboriginal nations acquiesced, the 
Hudson's Bay Company and French traders (prior to the 
defeat of the French by the British at Quebec and Montreal 
in 1759-60) probably had the requisite possession of their 
posts, and of the lands that they were able to control in the 
immediate vicinity of those posts. When Lord Selkirk signed 
a treaty with the Crees and Ojibwas in 1817 and established 
the Red River Settlement, that probably would have extend-
ed British possession and control, and hence sovereignty, 
over lands within the Settlement. Beyond that, the Hudson's 
Bay Company, and prior to 1759-60 the French traders, may 
have been able to acquire sovereignty for Britain and France 
over territory where they exercised effective control by the 
assertion of authority and enforcement of English and 
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French law. However, in the absence of Aboriginal acquies-
cence, this may not have been sufficient for the acquisition 
of sovereignty in international law. 
Regarding the French, beyond the settled areas of New 
France it appears that they made no real effort to impose 
French authority or law on the Aboriginal nations. William 
Eccles, in an illuminating article published in 1984, referred 
to the French/Indian relationship as one of "sovereignty I 
association".29 Cornelius Jaenen, in an equally informative 
article entitled "French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood 
during the French Regime",30 concluded as follows: 
On the international level, France like other Euro-
pean powers involved in colonization of America 
asserted her sovereign rights over a vast continental 
expanse. At the regional level, dealing with "inde-
pendent" peoples, she refrained from interference 
with original territorial rights, customs, and mode 
of life. French laws since 1664 applied only to 
colonists and were not imposed on native in-
habitants.31 
As for the Hudson's Bay Company, its lack of authority 
over the Aboriginal nations was clearly revealed by the 
testimony of Sir George Simpson, Governor of the Compa-
ny, before the Select Committee of the House of Commons 
on the Hudson's Bay Company in 1857: 
Mr. Grogan: What privileges or rights do the native 
Indians possess strictly applicable to themselves? 
Simpson: They are perfectly at liberty to do what 
they please; we never restrain Indians. 
Grogan: Is there any difference between their posi-
tion and that of the half-breeds? 
Simpson: None at all. They hunt and fish, and live 
as they please. They look to us for their supplies, 
and we study their comfort and convenience as 
much as possible; we assist each other. 
Lord Stanley: You exercise no authority whatever over 
the Indian tribes? 
Simpson: None at all.32 
What then are the implications of this absence of 
European possession and control of most of Rupert's Land? 
In my opinion, it means that neither the French nor the 
British acquired sovereignty over much of that territory 
prior to 1870. So when the Hudson's Bay Company surren-
dered Rupert's land back to the British Crown and the 
Crown transferred it to Canada in 1870, what territory 
actually passed? At the most, only the territory that had been 
effectively possessed and controlled by the Company. For 
the most part, in 1870 the Aboriginal nations in the Hudson 
watershed were still independent, and if anyone was in 
The signing of Treaty Number One at Lower Fort Garry, August 1871. PAM 
possession and control of most of the territory, they were. In 
short, they were the real sovereigns and owners of land in 
most of Rupert's Land in 1870.33 
One implication of this is that the meaning and effect of 
the Indian treaties signed within Rupert's Land has to be 
reassessed. The commonly-accepted view is that Canada 
already had sovereignty over the territory covered by the 
eleven numbered treaties when they were signed from 1871 
to 1921 (with some later adhesions), and that those docu-
ments were really land surrenders.34 The analysis in this 
article challenges this. If this analysis is correct, Canadian 
sovereignty in most of the Hudson watershed would not 
have been acquired until the treaties were signed. Moreover, 
the sovereignty the Aboriginal nations surrendered to 
Canada by the treaties may not have been total. Instead, the 
treaties may well have involved a new regime of shared 
sovereignty, just as they involved a sharing of the land and 
its resources.35 Put another way, there is room within the 
treaties for a continuing Aboriginal right of self-government. 
As the treaties were given constitutional status in Canada by 
the Constitution Act, 1982, this right would now be coi:istitu-
tionally protected. 
If Canada did not acquire sovereignty over most of the 
Hudson watershed until the treaties were signed, a major 
problem with respect to Aboriginal capacity to sign those 
agreements disappears. The problem is this. In the 
Delgamuukw decision, the Supreme Court said that Aborig-
inal title can be proved by showing that the Aboriginal 
nation asserting it occupied the claimed land at the time the 
Crown acquired sovereignty. Among other things, at least 
some of the numbered treaties involved a surrender of rights 
held by virtue of Aboriginal title. But in Rupert's Land, the 
Aboriginal nations who signed those treaties were not 
necessarily the same nations who had occupied the lands in 
1670 the Crees, Ojibwas and Assiniboines, for example, 
all moved into new territories in the course of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries.36 So if the Crown did 
acquire sovereignty over the whole of Rupert's Land in 1670, 
as is commonly assumed, in some instances the Canadian 
government may have signed treaties with the wrong 
Aboriginal nations! As I said, this difficulty disappears if 
Crown sovereignty was only acquired when the treaties 
were entered into.37 
Not all of Rupert's Land was included in the numbered 
treaties. Aboriginal claims in some parts of the Hudson 
watershed, notably in Quebec and the Northwest Terri-
tories, were not dealt with until modem land claims 
agreements were signed, beginning with the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement in 1975. Moreover, some areas 
may still be subject to unsurrendered Aboriginal title. In the 
regions not possessed and controlled by the Hudson' s Bay 
Company, and not covered by the numbered treaties, 
Canadian sovereignty may not have been acquired until 
sometime between 1870 and the present-day by the imposi-
tion of Canadian authority on the Aboriginal peoples living 
there, in most cases without their consent.38 In areas of the 
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North, this may not have occurred until well into this 
century, an embarrassing instance of relatively recent colo-
nialism on the part of our own govemment.39 
So where the Aboriginal peoples are concerned, many 
important issues involving both law and history remain 
unresolved. Old questions of sovereignty, boundaries, and 
the like, often have profound contemporary significance for 
the rights of these peoples. These questions cannot be 
answered solely from the perspective of one discipline. As 
history and law tend to be intertwined in complex and 
intriguing ways, neither can be ignored if a proper under-
standing of Aboriginal rights is to be achieved. 
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